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INTRODUCTION

19
unjust advantages for themselves or others" (Article 416-bis; Italian Criminal Code). Different 157 crime syndicates originated from different Italian regions, e.g., Cosa Nostra from Sicily, Camorra 158 from Campania, and 'Ndrangheta from Calabria. To preserve the confidentiality of the victims, we 159 anonymized the university where the misconduct took place (here referred to as 'Troy'), and the 160 crime syndicate involved (here generically described as 'mafia'). The mafia organization considered 161 is a confederation of clans, each with full jurisdiction on a territory and not subordinated to other 162 'authorities'. Clans are family-based, as only family members inherit and hold key positions of 163 power; external people can be enrolled however as full members, affiliates, or collaborators. The 164 business of mafia clans is primarily illegal, e.g. drug-trafficking; fraud; loan sharking; homicide; 165 robbery; extortion; kidnapping; tax evasion; bribery.
166
The project of professional misconduct presented in this study involved the graduation of mafia 167 affiliates as healthcare professionals from Troy University. The clan had a list of students (either 168 affiliated to the clan or paying the clan for 'favours') who 'had to' pass the exam with 'good 169 marks'. It then recruited university professors to grade affiliates' exams positively, making sure that 170 every identified student quickly graduated; relax, prevent or resist peer reviews that might detect 171 anomalies; and prevent or adjust the implementation of new regulations against mafia infiltration.
172
The graduating affiliates would then be allocated to healthcare organizations (e.g. clinics, hospitals 173 and commissioning groups) to enact another stage of misconduct, e.g. provide false medical reports, 174 divert public funding, or engage in pork barrelling. In this study, we focus only on the first stage, i.e. how the mafia clan recruited university professors to facilitate the graduation of 'its' students.
176
METHODS
177
To investigate how the mafia clan recruited professors at Troy University, we employed a 178 longitudinal case study approach (Eisenhardt et al., 2016) . We selected Troy University because it 179 represented an extreme case of an 'abhorrent' external agent (i.e. a mafia clan) penetrating a 180 professional organization, recruiting professionals and controlling their misconduct for decades.
181
The case is extreme in the intensity of professionals' subjugation because of the methods employed by the clan. The case reveals clear strategic intent and dynamics of professional recruitment, which 183 are elsewhere more ambiguous. The recruitment of the Troy professors can thus "illuminate and 184 extend relationships among constructs or develop deeper understanding of processes" (p. 1114).
185
To analyse this phenomenon, the study used primarily legal and historical data. The role of crime 186 syndicates in controlling professional groups is typically inaccessible to traditional research 187 approaches (Neuman and Wiegand, 2000) because information about the violation of rules and the 188 exploitation of people is withheld from researchers and accessible only by police forces and legal 189 authorities. Our longitudinal analysis thus started with evidence of the misconduct (from trial 190 verdicts) and then analysed the design and implementation of its strategy by the clan.
191
Our data collection strategy sought a "deep immersion over time in the focal phenomena with 192 openness to many types of rich data-from text, observations, and surveys to, more recently,
193
Twitter feeds, YouTube videos, and Facebook posts" (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; p. 1114 actions. Contributing to the validity of the data, the trials were presided over by different judges
219
(who cross-validated previous verdicts); and each trial went through the three judicial levels (each 220 with different judges). Hence we had multiple triads of judges analysing the phenomenon. To be 221 noted is that appeal and last resort for Trial A could not be accessed as they were withheld by the 222 law courts (currently in the process of digitalizing and anonymizing the documents). We are 223 however confident that we do not have incomplete or inappropriate data because we (i) had 224 reassurances from the judges presiding over the missing trials that these confirmed the full trial and 225 did not introduce radically new elements; and (ii) we collected data from journalistic and 226 parliamentary sources, which provided day-by-day and summary proceedings of the appeal and last 227 resort trials, and confirmed that no radical changes occurred. These data sources included: articles 228 from local and national newspapers; books; documentaries; parliamentary documents (e.g. reports
229
and proceedings of the Antimafia Commission). These data were important for four reasons. First,
230
they further validated our main data as specialized journalists and commentators did not challenge 231 the method and results of the trials. Second, we gained full access to data either reported partially or 232 only referenced in the trial documents. Third, these sources added information about professionals' 233 perceptions of and opinions on the infiltration of Troy University, and more details on non-illegal 234 phenomena that the trial analysed briefly. Fourth, they provided information on the appeal and last 235 resort verdicts, confirming the findings of the full trial. Ethical considerations apply to our data 236 collection. Given the sensitive nature of the trial (with the intimidation of some individuals and 237 legal prosecution of others), we preserved the anonymity of individuals involved in the events, 238 excluding details on the mafia clan, and the infiltrated university, which could identify the case. We 239 did not collect data (e.g. interviews, affidavits, reports) prepared by defence and prosecution, and 240 not validated by independent third-parties. These data could be biased and reduce the reliability of 241 our analysis. Our data analysis was informed by previous literature, which is rich with explanations as to why 244 professionals engage in misconduct, but not how external agents design their recruitment strategies.
245
As we could not test hypotheses, we generated theory from the data, and compared the emerging 246 theory with existing findings on perverse and pervasive antecedents of misconduct (Palmer, 2012).
247
We followed the advice of Eisenhardt et al. (2016) The clan required professors from Troy University to support the graduation of a heterogeneous 267 cadre of students. Some students were affiliated to the mafia, which envisaged their graduation as as the "University of Exams". The legal proceedings noted the "anomalous trajectories" of 275 "numerous students", who had had "more than mediocre" academic careers at other universities and 276 then "miraculously" surged in performance once they moved to Troy. Students knew from the very 277 beginning that they could get favourable marks in certain exams, and paid for this privilege.
278
Knowledge of Troy University as a corrupt provider was so widespread among students that even 279 foreign students queued to join the University to help their graduation. 
284
Notably, a young affiliate with a personal interest in medicine moved to another university to test 285 her actual medical knowledge -knowing that s/he could return to Troy to obtain a good grade.
286
Witness [A] passed three exams at Troy without any help from the clan. S/he later transferred to [an A-
level university] to test her real skills. The transfer decision was not problematic. If s/he failed, s/he could
The misconduct was perpetrated by a heterogeneous cadre of professors at Troy. Few professors 290 colluded with the clan; with them the clan used a combination of perverse and pervasive processes, 291 mostly grounded on (i) the use of incentives, and (ii) hierarchical control by the mafia hierarchy.
292
Other professors participated against their will, so that the clan employed a more forceful approach 293 using a different combination of perverse and pervasive processes grounded on (i) the use of threats, 294 and (ii) professional control by the administrative system, and social influence by peers. University, where they worked as professors, suppliers or administrators. 
310
The University was also influenced by a dominant elite of local politicians, freemasons and Second, the clan recruited professors through threats mixed with incentives. Threats were necessary 423 to push the reluctant professors toward misconduct; the incentives bound the professor to the clan.
424
Accepting the bribe meant that professors were co-responsible for the misconduct, and thus could 
462
Differently, students contributed to a more situational influence on professors. These students had 463 free access to university spaces, so they could observe professors' behaviours daily, and impart
464
"punishments" and "warnings". The clan infiltrated its students in various departments of the 465 university, so they could put pressure professors. These students also intimidated peers, secretaries 466 and administrators, gradually gaining their (often grudging) support or silence. Students' pressures were manifested through small, but eloquent gestures -enough to create a climate of oppression 468 and showcase the presence of the clan, but not sufficient to over-expose themselves and the clan.
Fourth, the clan exploited weaknesses in the peer review system. Professors could have spotted 502 irregularities in others' marking and graduation practices, and formed a united front to fight against 503 the clan infiltration. Notably, several professors acknowledged an "intolerable climate of 504 intimidation" in the university, and sometimes discussed this privately. However, there is no 505 evidence that professors allied to confront this problem. In part, this was due to the presence of the 506 clan in key structures and processes. Hence, professors did not have free spaces where they could 507 plan a defensive strategy without the intrusion of clan supporters. In part, professors had a pervasive 508 reluctance to "stick their noses into others' affairs" which was informed by their professional 509 autonomy. While investigations did not pay extensive attention to this aspect -as it did not violate 510 laws -several commentators argued that even "honest" professors had been slow to monitor others' 511 behaviours; as well as reluctant to allow external, impartial, parties monitor their own behaviours.
512
Any attempt to denounce misconduct in Troy was always rejected as non-scientific. Professors would
discuss their problems only with their peers, and refuse to answer our questions. We asked about bombs
and blood, arguing that "keeping the peace and quiet" could have killed any of them. And yet, professors
argued that the accusations were not scientific, and thus worthless (Journalist, Newspaper extract)
516
The clan could exploit the fact that professors already worked in disciplinary siloes and did not 
533
This was a sensible choice because teaching curricula were strongly protected against radical was worried that the gap between marks and skills could be so transparently wide that students 566 would complain about it. The clan expected its protégées to be "good enough" rather than the best 567 in the class; and sanctioned situations where professors were too generous or students went too far. 
572
Several students contemplated the perverse benefits of the "University of Exams", and moved to 573 Troy to take easier exams. These students knew they could graduate rapidly, and exploit the status 574 quo. Troy experienced a phenomenon of 'adverse selection' because talented students moved away 575 from Troy and were replaced by those who had failed elsewhere. Regular students also had no 576 compelling reason to denounce misconduct, as it could delegitimize their grades and because the 577 inflation of grades was convenient. As students' careers could be complicated by a scandal in their 578 university, they were not incentivized to denounce cases of professional misconduct.
579
Besides these considerations, the clan reinforced its pre-existing ties with the 'dominant elite' by 
600
Studies on pervasive mechanisms instead explain the broader contamination of institutional 601 contexts and professional associations (Jaraush, 1990) . To instead investigate the interplay between 602 perverse and pervasive mechanisms, our study focused on an 'abnormal' misconduct project (i.e.
603
corrupted exam marking) designed by 'abhorrent' social agents (i.e. a clan), and mostly executed by 604 'normal', reluctant, professionals. Our findings reveal that the capacity of the external agent to 605 recruit these professionals could not be explained simply with the use of incentives. Rather, the 606 external agent: (i) infiltrated the professional system to implement perverse interventions and 607 control pervasive processes; and (ii) used a stepped approach to normalize the misconduct. These 608 findings represent our main contributions, and will be discussed in the following sections.
609
Infiltrating pervasive professional processes with a Trojan horse for perverse reasons 610 Past research suggests that professionals mostly enact misconduct as a deviant behaviour because of 611 perverse mechanisms; or, alternatively, as a normal behaviour because of pervasive mechanisms 612 (Palmer, 2012) . Diversely, the mafia clan studied here strategically combined perverse and 613 pervasive mechanisms to recruit and control professionals in a misconduct project. This is 614 somewhat surprising, as the lack of control over organizational and professional processes of the mafia clan may suggest a primary, if not exclusive, focus on perverse antecedents, e.g. incentives 616 and threats. Contrary to this hypothesis, however, the mafia clan was capable of nesting pervasive 617 mechanisms into perverse ones to achieve superior outcomes. For instance, while the mafia clan 
626
This result furnishes insights into how external agents penetrate organizational practices that are (Gabbioneta et al., 2014; McGivern and Ferlie, 2007; Palmer, non-professional 'temptations' and (ii) 
754
To conclude, we want to highlight some considerations on our methodology. We relied closely on 755 secondary sources, most of which were collected by actors (e.g. law-enforcement agencies) for non-756 research purposes. Key informants were inaccessible for primary data collection, and this is indeed 757 typical of several instances of professional misconduct and illicit activities. We believe that the use 758 of secondary sources is vital for increasing the number and quality of studies on these elusive 759 topics, as we could analyse data that we could not have collected on our own (e.g. insights into the 760 criminal activities obtained directly from wiretapped conversations). By navigating this trade-off,
761
we believe that the literature on professional misconduct could gain access to vital, and yet 762 otherwise inaccessible, phenomena.
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